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IN THE

Supreme Court
of the

STATE OF UTAH
EOSE GIBBONS, and
AUSTIN K. TIEENAN,
Appellants,
vs.
E. G. FEAZIEE, and
UTAH COPPEE COMPANY,
a Corporation,
Eespondents.

NO.
4378

Respondents' Reply to Appellants'
Application for Rehearing
While avoiding a re-argument of this case, we will
comment as briefly as possible upon appellants' application for rehearing and their argument in support
thereof.
At the outset we are confronted with the statement beginning at the bottom of page 3 of appellants'
application and frequently renewed in varying form
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

throughout the course of appellants' argument in support of that application, that this court saw fit to go
outside the briefs of counsel and brief the case for itself, and that in reaching its conclusion did so without
the aid of argument.
Coupled with this

In this we think counsel erred.

statement

counsel intimate

respondents' counsel have been unfair in

that

attacking

their proof of discovery and the existence of the other
essentials of a valid location upon the occasion of the
entry of the Valentine Script—they state they feel
" a b u s e d " because (as we interpret their remark) we
conceded the validity of the location upon the trial
below.

We so interpret their remark because other-

wise they would have no reason to feel abused.

Such

is the gravamen of this application for rehearing and
the argument thereupon.
This is the appellants' lawsuit—an action in ejectment brought by them, wherein to succeed they must
establish in themselves the paramount title to the premises in question—that burden is theirs. I t was upon the
trial below, upon the argument here and still is the
theory of respondents that appellants can succeed in
this suit only upon proof of legal title in themselves
to the area in dispute, and that they cannot do because
the government by its patent upon the Valentine Script
had parted with its title to that area years before the
entry or patent of the placer upon which appellants
found their claim; that if appellants' suit in ejectment
is to.be construed a.suit in equity to.set aside the pat2
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ent upon the Valentine Script, then respondents must
be permitted the defense of laches.

Neither the trial

court nor this court have indicated any intention of so
treating this suit in ejectment.

Accordingly, upon the

trial below, when appellants

attempted to prove

valid

objected

discovery, respondents

effort as calling

a

to appellants'

for matter "wholly irrelevant,

in-

competent and immaterial to any issue in this case",
(Tr. 59-60) and as a collateral attack upon the senior
patent; that in this case the discovery on the placer
claim was not in issue (Tr. 60); that for the purpose
of this suit no legal title to the area in dispute could
be predicated upon

the

placer

patent

until by an

appropriate action in equity the senior patent upon
the Valentine Script had been set aside; that appellants
by their proof of such outstanding senior patent through
which respondents deraign their title, had precluded
any possibility of their success in the form of action
they had chosen.

Then counsel with alacrity chose to

interpret respondents' objection as an admission of
discovery, very properly testing this assumption, however, by the following:

(Tr. 62-63)

" M r . McBroom: J u s t one point. Do you
question the discovery at the time of the location
of these deeds'?
" M r . Ellis: We take the record as it has
been offered in evidence, that is all we know
about it.
(Argument and discussion.)
3
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" T h e Court: When the United States Government issues a mining patent, isn't the mining
patent enough?
" M r . McBroom: I think so, your Honor,
but the question may arise.
" M r . Wallace: We will not go further, if
your Honor please, to amplify this tender. I t
may be necessary, if there is going to be any
question about this thing, so that my record may
be sufficient.
" T h e Court: We have some legal questions
to dispose of after a while, and I think you may
introduce that proof of discovery, if you wish to.
"Mr. Parsons:

Note an exception.

" T h e Court: As I say, I don't see any
reason why it should be done, or how it can
affect the issues in this case, but there may be
something in the record that you will want.
" M r . Wallace: If I didn't sincerely believe
that it might arise, of course, I should not take
the time of the court about this thing.
" T h e Court: If you disagree with me, if
you feel that it is necessary to prove that fact,
and want to make your record with reference to
the discovery, you may proceed to do that. I
take it that the presumption is that there was a
discovery, mineral discovery, and that the location is properly made, and that presumption
arises from the fact that the United States Government later issued a patent, a mining patent,
on that ground. I take it that that is the position
counsel takes for the reason of his objection.
" M r . Wallace: If counsel will take that
position, your Honor, I would be through, but I

4
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would want him to take that concretely and
specifically, but they say they will not.
" M r . P a r s o n s : Counsels' position is that
the McGruire & Company Placer is wholly apart
from this investigation, and has no place in this
case.
" T h e Court: That raises the same question
that we have argued already.
"Mr. Parsons:

I think so, your Honor.

" T h e Court: And the court, while being
inclined to agree with you, sustained the position
of opposing counsel for the purpose of looking
into the legal question later. The objection may
be overruled, and you may now proceed.
"Mr. Parsons:

Exception."

and then counsel proceeded to make their proof to
which reference was made by our brief and upon which
we predicated both written and oral argument in this
court.
It would indeed be a strange rule that if a defendant during the trial, intent upon his conception of
the issues and the law applicable thereto as he understood it, made an objection in the course of the plaintiff's examination, which objection the court overruled
that the plaintiff might make his case upon his own
theory, that then the defendant would thereafter
argument be precluded

from

testing

the plaintiff's

case upon plaintiff's own theory so adopted.
more than that has occurred here.

in

Nothing

Respondents did

5
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not concede a discovery and appellants know they did
not (Tr. 6 3 ) :
" M r . Wallace: If counsel will take that position, your Honor, I would be through, but I
would want him to take that concretely and
specifically, but they say they will n o t . "
The appellants were permitted to make their proof and
presumably did their best.
It is equally strange that appellants now assert
that this court came to its conclusion here without the
aid of argument.

In respondents' brief, beginning at

page 22, will be found a discussion of the decision of
the Supreme Court of the United States in Creed and
Cripple Creek Mining & Milling Co. v. Uintah Tunnel
Mining & Transportation

Co., wherein respondents'

counsel direct particular attention to the rule declared
in that case to the effect that the mere issuance of
patent " upon the McOuire & Company placer claim * * *
raised no presumption of a discovery at any time prior
to entry * * * nor any presumption of the staking of
the claim on the ground, hence no presumption of a
valid location prior to that date. Not only is there no
presumption of a valid location upon the occasion of
either entry or patent of the Valentine Script, but by
all the authorities the issuance of the non-mineral patent

was such an adjudication

against the mineral

character of the land and of its unoccupied and unappropriated condition as to be conclusive upon collateral attack in an action at either law or equity.''
6
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A

further discussion of the decision of the United States
Circuit Court of Appeals in Uintah Tunnel Mining &
Transportation Co. v. Creed, 119 Fed. 164, 57 C. C. A.
200, with emphasis again directed to the same question, will be found in respondents' brief beginning at
page 38. Commencing at page 47 of respondents' brief
is a discussion of what is necessary to a determination
of the mineral or non-mineral character of land, and
quoting from 18 E. C. L. § 122, at page 1222, will be
found the statement that " l a n d is not mineral unless
it can be said that ' mineral can be obtained from it in
such quantities and quality as to make it more valuable
for mining than for agriculture' or uses other than
mining", following which will be found at page 48,
respondents' citation of Crissman v. Miller, and Steele
v. Tannana Mines E. Co., in the discussion of what is
necessary to a valid discovery, and at page 49, abstract
of the testimony admitted below to prove that fact,
which discussion is continued upon page 50 and contains the statement that *i there was no testimony whatever as to the monumenting or marking of the claim
on the ground * * * . "

And therein, while reiterating

our theory of the case and stating in our opinion that
"appellants' theory *.* * confuses all distinctions between law and equitable actions and the relief and defenses applicable thereto

respectively",

nevertheless

that that part of the Valentine Script in conflict with
the placer claim appeared non-mineral and that neither
monumenting nor discovery had been proved upon the

7
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placer claim, " a n d hence neither can be presumed upon
the occasion of the Valentine Script e n t r y . "

And the

appellants in their reply brief devote pages 8 to 14,
both inclusive, to a discussion of this very question,
saying that they felt abused and charging us with having "changed

theory on appeal."

And

turning to

appellants' assignments of error (Tr. 60) we find that
while appellants asserted in their application for rehearing that no finding had been made upon which this
court can predicate its decision, still appellants chose
to treat Finding No. 2 (Tr. 12) as such a finding and
assigned error in the making thereof because (Tr. 60)
" t h e proof shows without contradiction that the McGuire & Company Placer Mining Claim was duly located
prior to the entry of the west half of the east half of
the northwest quarter of Section 26, and prior to the
issuance of the agricultural patent to Bentley, and in
consequence the mineral patent conveyed title by relation to the date of discovery and location".

Are we

to be precluded from discussing that assignment merely
because the taking of testimony upon the discovery and
monumenting and other essentials to a valid location
of the placer claim was over our objection and did not
conform with our theory of the case! This court rested
its decision largely upon Creed and Cripple Creek Mining & Milling Co. v. Uintah Mining & Transportation
Co., Crissman v. Miller and Steele v. Tannana Mines
R. Co., all of them cited by respondents and given the
same application they served in the opinion of this
8
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court.

But in addition, there appears in the opinion

of this court the following brief excerpt from the decision of the Supreme Court of Montana in Hickey v.
Anaconda C. M. Co., 33 Mont. 46, 81 Pac. 806:
" I n our judgment, when a patentee seeks to
show that his title is older than the evidence of
his title indicates—when he seeks to show that,
notwithstanding the date of his patent or receiver 's final receipt, his title in fact relates back
to the date of his location, he must show affirmatively a location valid under the laws of the
state where the claim is situated."
Certainly no, court has ever taken exception to that
portion of the decision in Hickey v. Anaconda C. M.
Co. quoted above.

That decision was followed upon

that point by the Supreme Court of Arizona as late as
September 14, 1922, in Tom Reed Gold Mines Co. v.
United Eastern Mining Co., 24 Ariz. 269, 209 Pac. 283;
(certiorari denied, 260 U. S. 744, 67 L. Ed. 492, 43 Sup.
Ct, 165) at 292 the court said:
i

' One who claims rights anterior to the entry
of a mining claim for patent and dependent upon
the order of the facts making up the right to
the land is not concluded by the patent, but may
show such order, including the fact of his own
prior discovery of mineral. Cases supra, and
Kahn v. Old Teleg. M. Co., 2 Utah, 174-188, 11
Morrison's Mining Reports, 645; Last Chance
Mining Co. v. Tyler Mining Co., 61 Fed. 557, 566,
9 C. C. A. 613; Hickey v. Anaconda C. M. Co.,
33 Mont. 46, 81 Pac. 806; Butte & S. Co. v.
Clark Mont. Realty Co., 249 U. S. 12, 39 Sup.
9
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Ct. 231, 63 L. Ed. 447; Lindley on Mines (3d
Ed.) § 783."
That is hornbook learning.

The decision stressed by

counsel of the United States Circuit Court of Appeals
for the Ninth Circuit in Butte & Superior Copper Co.
v. Clark-Montana Realty Co., 248 Fed. 609, in no manner questions the propriety of that statement, and the
decision of the Supreme Court of the United States in
the same case to be found in 249 U. S. 12, 63 L. Ed.
447, contains the following reference to the rule made
in the manner of one stating a legal maxim:
'' Priority of right is not determined by
dates of entries or patents of the respective
claims, but by priority of discovery and location,
which may be shown by testimony other than the
entry and p a t e n t . "
By the statutes of Montana a declaratory statement was
required to be recorded twenty days after discovery
and in the Hickey case it was held the statement recorded did not conform with the statute; that the statement
in the prescribed form was necessary to a valid location; that by reason of this failure the location was
invalid; that the patent title could not relate back to an
invalid location so as to defeat intervening adverse
rights.

This was a logical application of the rule we

are discussing and the federal court took no exception
to the rule, but, influenced by the passage of a statute
expressly saving the validity of locations wherein the
declaratory statement was defective, held merely that
10
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the declaratory statement was not essential to a valid
location and the location in that case being valid, the
patent title would relate back to the date of such perfected location.
declaratory

We are not here interested

statement requirement

in

the

of the Montana

statutes, and the Hickey case and that portion of the
decision therein quoted by this court, correctly states
tJie rule relative to the establishment of priority when
claimed

to

Creed and

antedate final entry,

following therein

Cripple Creek Mining & Milling

Co. v.

Uintah Tunnel Mining & Transportation Co., and the
host of other decisions to the

same effect.

titles of course relate to the valid locations.

Patent
Kahn v.

The Old Telegraph Mining Company,2 Utah 174. Patent titles do not relate to invalid locations.

Patent

titles do not by relation cut off rights that intervene
before such locations became valid or were perfected,
and hence the necessity where the proponent

relies

upon a title antedating final entry, he must prove a
valid location and the date when the same became perfected and valid, to which discovery and monumenting
upon the ground are unavoidable essentials. It is said
by the Supreme Court of the United States in Creed
and Cripple Creek M. & M. Co. v. Uintah Tunnel Mines
& Transportation Co. that " t h e plaintiff's right does
not antedate his discovery; at least it does not prevail
over any then existing r i g h t s . " What the relation may
be in the absence of intervening rights is a matter without interest to us here. In the present casQ rights have
11
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intervened, rights of a dignity no less than those of a
United States patent.

And to defeat the presumption

arising thereupon the burden was upon the appellants,
on their own theory of the case, to prove when their
location was perfected and became a valid location.
We make this statement by way of argument upon
appellants' theory, although still insisting that such an
inquiry would be appropriate only in an equitable action to set aside respondents' senior patent.

Brock-

bank v. Albion Mining Co., 29 Utah 367, 81 Pac. 863.
The Creed case is sufficient authority and was so regarded by this court, and in view of the consideration
given by this court to and its decision upon this question,

there appears no necessity

for an additional

argument thereof now.
Nor is it immaterial when the claim was marked
on the ground. Lindley on Mines, 3d Ed.:
•"§ 339. Discovery is but one step in acquiring title to a mining claim. It must be followed
by location."
" § 371. The Bevised Statutes of the United
States contain the mandatory provision, that the
* location must be distinctly marked on the
ground so that its boundaries can be readily
traced.' There is no escape from this requirement. * * * The requirement is an imperative
and indispensable condition precedent to a valid
location, and is not to be 'frittered away by construction.' After the discovery, it is the main
act of original location."
12
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In Brockbank v. Albion Mining Co., 29 Utah 367,
81 Pac. 863, this court held t h a t :
" * * * where a discovery of mineral
has been made, and a proper location notice
filed, then, if the boundaries are marked on the
ground, before intervening rights have accrued,
the claim will be valid. The locator, however,
delays at his peril, since thereby he assumes the
risk of intervening rights of third parties. # * * "
The mineral character of the land in a contest between a mineral and a non-mineral entryman is not to
be settled in favor of the mineral entry merely by the
finding of color, even though such discovery may afford
sufficient

encouragement to miners to continue their

exploration in the hope of finding gold in paying quantities.

(Steele v. Tannana Mines E. Co., discussed at

pages 48 and 49 of respondents' brief and cited and
relied upon by this court in its decision in this case).
As pointed out in respondents' brief—"In a contest between

mineral and non-mineral

claimants

it is in-

cumbent upon the former to show as a present fact that
the character of the land is such that mineral can be
obtained from it in such quantity and quality as to
make it more valuable for mining than for agriculture.
* * * When the controversy is between two mineral
claimants the rule respecting the sufficiency of mineral
is more liberal than when it is between a mineral claimant and one seeking to make an agricultural entry, for,
by the very nature of the controversy between mineral
claimants, it is tacitly assumed that the land is min13
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eral." (§ 122, 18 E. C. L., page 1222, cited at pages
30 and 31 of respondents' brief.)
By the non-mineral patent upon the Valentine
Script (the senior patent) we have an adjudication by
the Land Department that the land so patented was
non-mineral in character. Appellants' testimony must
be weighed in relation to their burden, if this action is
to take on the character of one in equity and appellants
be afforded herein an opportunity upon equitable principles to set aside the non-mineral patent. So measured, their effort must fail as decided by this court. It
is fairly apparent from the testimony, we think, that
the only value this placer claim now has or ever had
was for residence, to which use it has been put. As
testified by the appellants' witness Michael Gibbons
(Ab. 51) " I t is pretty well roofed over, yes." There
is no testimony from which one could conclude this
adjudication, accomplished by the non-mineral patent,
was in error.
Counsel expect much from the doctrine of relation,
not merely that the patent title relates to the perfected
valid location, but that a location once initiated may
be perfected at any time and thereafter should patent
issue, such patent title would relate to the time of the
initial step, whether or not rights have intervened before such location attained any validity. A mere
statement of their contention condemns it. Appellants
can find no authority upon which to predicate it.
14
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CONCLUSION.
This court has considered and correctly decided
sufficient of the questions involved in the case as to
have conclusively disposed of the controversy. It has
neither misconceived nor overlooked any material fact
or facts that could affect the result it has attained by
its decision, and it has based its decision on no wrong
principle of law. Indeed, this court has founded its
decision upon principles so elementary and universally
accepted as to forbid a doubt as to the soundness thereof. Appellants' application for rehearing should be
denied.
Respectfully submitted,
DICKSON, ELLIS, PARSONS & ADAMSON,
Attorneys for Respondents.
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